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Abstract 
I provide a method of investigating identity both for ourselves and for others by 
exploring the connection between William James’ pluralism and Hannah Arendt’s 
ideas on the self. In §2, I present James’ pluralism for how we can view our world 
and self, which will serve as the foundation for this investigation. In §3, I lay out 
how Arendt attributes the availability of identity for others in terms of action. The 
question of “Who are you?” is addressed in this section by applying James’ 
pluralism to Arendt’s notion of action. In §4, I apply Arendt’s notions of solitude 
and loneliness to an investigation of the identity of ourselves. I conclude that when 
we view the world pluralistically we can find insight into how to understand the 
identity of both ourselves and others. 
 
1 Introduction 
In The Compounding of Consciousness, William James (1967) presents a pluralistic 
worldview; our minds can make sense of the world in a twofold way. We can 
intellectualize our world through concepts and definitions, or we can think about our 
world in nonconceptual terms. James claims that these two modes are not reducible to 
each other. This two-fold, pluralistic thought can be applied to the idea of the self. “Who 
am I?” This is a question we can ask ourselves, and we can ask this question towards 
another (“Who are you?”). Utilizing James’ pluralism we get different answers to these 
questions, depending on which mode of thought we employ. 
 
In order to investigate such answers, I call upon Hannah Arendt for her thought in The 
Human Condition and The Life of the Mind. In the former work, Arendt claims that an 
individual’s true identity can only come into being upon death, but in life it can become 
available to others through action and speech. Thus, Arendt claims that an individual 
can never have their true identity revealed to oneself. However, one can find light in the 
question of their identity through solitude. In the latter work, Arendt distinguishes 
solitude from loneliness, the state where one cannot be for themselves. James’ 
pluralistic thought will prove invaluable for our understanding of solitude. 
 
In the following analysis, I will provide a method of investigating identity both for 
ourselves and for others by exploring the connection between James’ pluralism and 
Arendt’s ideas on the self. In §2, I present James’ pluralism for how we can view our 
world, which will serve as the foundation for this investigation. In §3, I lay out how 
Arendt attributes the availability of identity for others in terms of action. The question 
of “Who are you?” is addressed in this section by applying James’ pluralism to Arendt’s 
notion of action. In §4, I consider the identity of ourselves through an investigation of 
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solitude and loneliness in Arendt’s thought. The question of “Who am I?” is addressed 
by applying James’ pluralism to Arendt’s notions of solitude and loneliness. I conclude 
that we find insight into how to understand the identity of ourselves and others when 
we view the world pluralistically. 
 
2 James’ Pluralism 
To understand James’ notion of pluralism, it will be helpful to begin with his thought 
on the Mills’ notions of mental compounding and mental chemistry, which James 
presents in The Compounding of Consciousness (James, 1967). The former notion, 
introduced by James Mill (1869), refers to how our mind takes simple ideas and forms 
more complicated ones; for example, our ability to imagine a unicorn calls for a 
compounding of the images of a horse and a horn. John Stuart Mill (1848) extended this 
idea to that of the latter notion, mental chemistry. Our minds do more than just 
compound ideas; sometimes they combine ideas in such a way that they may be 
impossible to undo. James provides the example of water. We could say that our notion 
of water as H2O is a mere compounding of the notions of two hydrogen atoms and one 
oxygen atom. However, the notion of H2O is not identical to that of two hydrogen atoms 
and one oxygen atom, for the former “affects surrounding bodies differently” (James, 
1967, 548) than the latter; H2O is a substance that quenches our thirst and makes 
things wet and so forth, while the ideas of the separate parts of H2O cannot capture this 
absolute alone. The ideas need to be fused in a way that allows for the additional 
meaning to be included. Thus, we must arrive at the notion of H2O by means of mental 
chemistry. 
 
James provides a further example of the alphabet to help clarify this notion (ibid, 549). 
The alphabet contains twenty-six letters, each which may be represented by an idea. 
But the idea of the alphabet of a whole provides a new idea, which James calls the 
introduction of a twenty-seventh fact in our consciousness (ibid, 549-550). He claims 
that we cannot dissect the alphabet into mere awarenesses of each individual letter but 
rather that there is awareness of the whole. In this manner, James presents two modes 
of appearances. One, there is the mode of parts, and two, there is a mode of wholes. 
However, a problem arises concerning these two modes of viewing since we need to know 
the relation between parts and wholes. James claims that there are only parts in the 
physical world (ibid, 551). For example, while we may call the grouping of organs a “bird” 
it remains that there really is just a collection of those parts, which our mind is able to 
bind into a whole. Thus James makes this distinction that while our world consists of 
parts, in the mental world, wholes are realized in themselves; the mode of viewing things 
as wholes is an experience for itself. While this distinction may be obscure, it will suffice 
for this discussion to note that James rejects the reduction of the experience of the 
absolute or whole into the experience of parts. 
 
James argues that the monist who attempts to make this reduction cannot escape the 
dualistic language they use to make this reduction (ibid, 553)3. My interpretation of this 
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claim is that James is drawing out the difficulty in explaining “mental chemistry” in 
purely conceptual or “intellectualist4” terms5. This argument against intellectualism can 
be understood through his example of a photographer (James, 1967, 560): When we 
envision a photographer, our concepts lead us to define such a person as one who 
photographs. But we can add more concepts to our image of the photographer (e.g., she 
might be wearing a red shirt). Now our definition has changed. Is this new person still 
a photographer? If so, then James maintains that our definition of a photographer now 
seems to include a requirement of wearing a red shirt. Thus, James’ point here is that 
intellectualism leads us unable to account for change in our experience. To avoid this 
problem, James claims that we don’t experience the world in a one-fold way such that 
appearances of parts and wholes are reducible to one another. Rather, there are two 
ways of viewing and thinking about the world, through conceptual terms that allow us 
to talk about the world with concepts and definitions, and through nonconceptual 
viewing that allow us to capture holistic human experience. 
 
I fear that the latter notion and its distinction from the former may still be unclear, so I 
hope to make it clear by introducing Goodman’s analysis of eight themes in James 
thought regarding the conceptual and nonconceptual: 
 
1. There is a nonconceptual element in experience that is widespread or 
ordinary. 
2.  That element is known by a kind of acquaintance. 
3.  Conceptual knowledge is shallower than acquaintance. It is “merely 
pragmatic,” whereas acquaintance lets us see into the life of things. 
4.  Nonconceptual knowledge cannot be described, but it can be indicated 
or pointed to. 
5.  Nonconceptual knowledge can be described, as a flow, confusion, 
profusion, particularity, animal life, the full self, whole field, a “much-
at-once.” 
6.  Concepts cut rather than synthesize. 
7.  Concepts are made out of the same material as perception. 
8.  Philosophy should seek a return from a life in concepts to a thicker 
life of intuition, empathy, and activity. 
            (Goodman, 2004, 143-144) 
 
We can now relate these themes to James’ discussion concerning the relation between 
wholes and parts. Experience can be viewed as wholes and parts. The latter is the result 
of conceptual terms; we can dissect our experiences by talking about them through 
concepts and definitions. But the former viewing, that of the whole, is to view the world 
without trying to rationalize it; it is to experience what James calls the absolute (James, 
1967, 551). Through these themes that Goodman draws, especially the fifth, we can see 
that James believes that the nonconceptual viewing of the world could involve “letting 
go” or simple acceptance of the world around us. With this understanding in mind, next, 
I provide the reader with a method of thinking about identity nonconceptually by 
investigating the question of identity of others through Arendt’s thought on human 
action and speech. 
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3 Identity in Action 
 
Before we investigate identity in the work of Arendt, we first need a brief overview of her 
account of action. Arendt avows that action is the sole activity that resides between 
humans, and thus it has no direct relation with things and matter (Arendt, 1958, 7). 
Action corresponds to the condition of political life; Arendt claims that to be human 
involves living among and interacting with other humans. This condition also holds that 
human beings are human because nobody who has lived or will live is the same as 
another. Because of our differences, our actions hold the significance of our lives on 
history. Arendt claims that action has a close connection with the condition of natality; 
when a human is born, they have the capacity of acting, which provides them with the 
ability to interact with and reveal themselves to others, and to have an impact on human 
political life (ibid., 9). In other words, action is very important to human life, and, as I 
will argue below, very important to identity. I interpret Arendt’s definition of action as 
the human capability of doing; in order to play a role in society, and therefore history, 
humans must interact with one another. By doing so, each actor discloses their own 
unique self to the world. 
 
Indeed, Arendt claims that the agent is revealed through action and in particular 
through speech (ibid., 175-181). In being human (i.e. being equal), we can understand 
each other. Yet additionally, in being human (i.e. being distinct), we are able to 
distinguish ourselves from each other and thus to make our identity known. Arendt 
maintains that this “paradoxical” plurality is the basic condition of action and speech. 
Through action and speech, an agent’s interactions with others reveal the question of 
their identity. With every person that one meets, the answer to “Who are you?” is implicit 
in their speech and action. Here Arendt makes salient the need for speech. Through 
spoken word, the actor identifies themselves “as the actor, announcing what they do, 
has done, and intends to do” (ibid., 179)6. Arendt is making the claim that speech allows 
humans to identify themselves when they perform actions. For example, I can tell my 
friend which bar I am going to tonight. This reveals myself as the actor who is going to 
the bar, and my friend can read this speech as making explicit the action, which in turn 
makes explicit an aspect of my identity7. 
 
In this manner, when asking ourselves “Who are you?” when we meet someone, we can 
find pieces of the answer in their speech and action. But when we learn about someone 
through their speech and action, we attribute different qualities (i.e. concepts and 
definitions) and thus become entangled in a description of what that person is. The 
point is that while the who of a person is disclosed implicitly in action and speech, our 
attempts to talk about this who lead us to describe what that person is (ibid., 181). 
 
James’ pluralism can be introduced here to help with this dilemma. As previously 
stated, we may talk about persons with concepts and definitions, which is facilitated by 
the ability to view the world in conceptual terms. Yet, while we can use these concepts 
and definitions in describing a person, we often want to do more than this. Our talk 
about persons has significance. When you talk to me about a third person, we both have 
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an understanding of that person that is implicit in our use of concepts and definitions; 
the who is implicit in our discussing of the what. If we heed Arendt’s words, then by our 
use of conceptual talk about a person, a person’s identity becomes available to use. The 
true identity of that person, may not be completely present, but it is implicit and thus 
available through their action and speech. Thus when we talk about this person, our 
use of conceptual terms succeeds only because we have an understanding of that 
person’s identity which made available to us through their action and speech. While we 
could try to pin down this understanding conceptually, it seems to me that we could 
never succeed; we must view the identity of others holistically8. We can view and talk 
about another person with concepts and definitions, and in talking about another 
person, we must have some notion of their identity that involves prior nonconceptual 
viewing of that person. To help clarify, recall and apply Goodman’s assertions of James’ 
themes 2, 4, and 5. The implicit availability of someone’s identity comes to us through 
our acquaintance with that person (theme 2); we cannot describe their identity 
completely, nevertheless we can talk about this person and understand each other 
(theme 4); and the best way to describe this nonconceptual viewing of their identity 
would be to call it a flow or a confusion9. 
 
Two further concerns arise here; we need to know if the true and full identity of a person 
(i.e., who they are) can be made not just available to others in facets but into actual 
being. And two, we need to know if one can know their own true and full identity. 
Concerning the former enquiry, Arendt asserts that who someone is comes into being 
only in death (ibid., 193). This coheres with Arendt’s notion of action; when a person 
dies, they can no longer act and thus no new qualities or aspects of their essence can 
be introduced, for without new action, there can be no new disclosures of the agent. In 
this manner, we may say that when a person passes, their identity is frozen in time. In 
death, the actor leaves behind their complete story. Everything we can find out about 
that person is available to us. We may say that their essence is not only available in 
facets, but their full essence is manifest in the world, which we can know by the story 
that they leave behind (ibid., 186). 
 
Second, in answer to the second concern of whether we can know ourselves fully, Arendt 
argues in the negative (ibid., 180). We may only disclose ourselves through our action 
and speech. We make our identity available to others, but as Arendt states, we cannot 
be the authors of our own story that we leave behind in death. As stated earlier, action 
goes between humans; it is part of the public realm. I interpret Arendt as saying that in 
order for us to know ourselves, we would not only have to step outside of ourselves, but 
traverse beyond our own deaths. And such a perspective is way beyond human 
capability. Nevertheless, Arendt alludes to the question of “Who am I?” in another work. 
In the next section, I investigate show how we can find insight into this question despite 
our inability to fully know ourselves; we can be “by ourselves”. 
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4 Solitude and Loneliness 
 
Arendt (1978, 185) makes a distinction between two states, solitude and loneliness. 
These two notions correspond to two ways that we may interact with ourselves. In the 
previous section, we saw that Arendt claims that to be human is to interact with others. 
By doing so, we reveal ourselves through action and speech, which we understood using 
James’ pluralism to allow us to understand each other both conceptually and 
nonconceptually. But what about the question of identity for ourselves? When I ask 
myself, “Who am I?” I engage in reflection; how I carry out reflection determines whether 
I will be in solitude or in a state of loneliness. Arendt avows that due to our ability of 
inner dialogue within ourselves (e.g. being able to ask ourselves questions within our 
minds), we may keep ourselves company. This results in a state of solitude. However, if 
we are unable to split-up ourselves into the speaker and listener of this inner dialogue, 
then we will fall into loneliness, and thus further away from knowing ourselves. Given 
this result, we need to know what exactly is this inner dialogue and how can we achieve 
solitude through it. 
 
Arendt claims that when we engage in dialogue with ourselves we must aim to be both 
the one who asks questions and the one who answers, and we must not contradict 
ourselves in this action (ibid., 185-186). We may think that this dialogue consists of our 
silent thoughts about things where we entertain different relations between concepts. 
However, Arendt seems to want to dive deeper in that true, successful inner dialogue 
escapes logical reasoning and concepts. She describes the relation between 
consciousness and thinking (ibid., 189). When we think conceptually, we use concepts 
and definitions to think about things. But this ability presupposes consciousness in the 
sense of self-awareness. In order to think, human consciousness must be actualized, 
and Arendt claims that this is only possible because we can accompany ourselves in 
solitude. And we may accompany ourselves in solitude only when we are for ourselves. 
If we are to be for ourselves, we cannot contradict ourselves, for we would not want to 
be our own opponents. I interpret Arendt’s main point here to be that in order to have 
silent dialogue with ourselves (using conceptual terms), we must have consciousness in 
the form of self-awareness, and this arises out of the human condition of being able to 
think oneself (not just about oneself) as both the speaker and listener10.Concerning the 
success of this dialogue as solitude or loneliness, James’ pluralism again resonates with 
Arendt’s point and makes it much clearer concerning how to be “for oneself”. 
 
When we think to ourselves in concepts and definitions, we can talk about things in our 
world by description. Concerning ourselves, we may describe what we are (viewing 
ourselves conceptually), but if we are to try to know who we are (viewing ourselves 
nonconceptually), we must engage in successful inner dialogue; we must be for 
ourselves. This is only possible when we “let go” of trying to pin our identity down with 
concepts. When we try to know who we are by viewing and thinking about ourselves 
conceptually, we get entangled in our descriptions (similarly to our enquiries into the 
identity of others discussed in the previous section). If we take Arendt’s account to be 
true, we can never know ourselves fully, but we can be here for ourselves. When we 
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apply James’ pluralism and think about ourselves nonconceptually, we don’t really 
come to know ourselves, however we can gain something that is valuable through 
nonconceptual self-awareness. If we want to be in solitude rather than loneliness, if we 
want to be both the speaker and listener for ourselves, then we must be fully present. 
My input here is that perhaps, as Arendt claims, we can’t know ourselves, but we can 
be present by and for ourselves if we can escape the continuous conceptualization of 
our experience. When we are able to realize ourselves in the present moment, when we 
are able to let go of trying to pin ourselves down with concepts and definitions, and 
when we are able to grasp this nonconceptual self-awareness, then we come to a state 
at ease. We no longer need to conceptually know ourselves, for we have found the 
condition of nonconceptual solitude. We stop trying to explain ourselves to ourselves 
and simply let the experience take hold. The question of “Who am I?” becomes trivial, 
for we have found an answer that is far better; “I am here.” 
 
5 Conclusion 
In summary, the questions of “Who are you?” and “Who am I?” have been addressed in 
Arendt’s thought in light of James’ Pluralism. Apropos the former enquiry, when we take 
Arendt’s account seriously, we find that viewing persons through their actions 
conceptually and nonconceptually yield different answers such that there is an implicit 
nonconceptual understanding in our conceptual viewing of other persons. With regards 
the second question, “Who am I?” it appears that in order to understand ourselves 
completely, we should stop trying to accomplish such understanding conceptually, for 
it might not even be possible. Rather, we should view ourselves nonconceptually by 
being present and thus in solitude. Arendt’s thought leads us into a position where we 
may view ourselves conceptually or nonconceptually and receive different results. I leave 
the reader to speculate that, despite these differences these two views that we may take 
concerning the identity of ourselves expound, we may find that both the conceptual and 
nonconceptual views have merit. Conceptual thought allows us to talk and think about 
ourselves and others, which seems to be a pragmatic necessity. But nonetheless it 
seems that we need nonconceptual thought to access who others really are, and further, 
we need nonconceptual thought to avoid loneliness. We may never know who we really 
are, but this is not something that should worry us. Rather than try to be the authors 
of our own story, we can simply realize ourselves by being for ourselves. I can be present 
and in solitude by my ability to know that “I am here”, which escapes my ability to define 
it with concepts11. 
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